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Differentially Private Distributed Constrained Optimization
Shuo Han, Ufuk Topcu, George J. Pappas
Abstract—Many resource allocation problems can be formu-
lated as an optimization problem whose constraints contain
sensitive information about participating users. This paper con-
cerns solving this kind of optimization problem in a distributed
manner while protecting the privacy of user information. Without
privacy considerations, existing distributed algorithms normally
consist in a central entity computing and broadcasting certain
public coordination signals to participating users. However, the
coordination signals often depend on user information, so that
an adversary who has access to the coordination signals can
potentially decode information on individual users and put user
privacy at risk. We present a distributed optimization algorithm
that preserves differential privacy, which is a strong notion that
guarantees user privacy regardless of any auxiliary information
an adversary may have. The algorithm achieves privacy by per-
turbing the public signals with additive noise, whose magnitude
is determined by the sensitivity of the projection operation onto
user-specified constraints. By viewing the differentially private
algorithm as an implementation of stochastic gradient descent,
we are able to derive a bound for the suboptimality of the
algorithm. We illustrate the implementation of our algorithm via
a case study of electric vehicle charging. Specifically, we derive the
sensitivity and present numerical simulations for the algorithm.
Through numerical simulations, we are able to investigate various
aspects of the algorithm when being used in practice, including
the choice of step size, number of iterations, and the trade-off
between privacy level and suboptimality.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric vehicles (EVs), including pure electric and hybrid
plug-in vehicles, are believed to be an important component
of future power systems [16]. Studies predict that the market
share of EVs in the United States can reach approximately
25% by year 2020 [12]. By that time, EVs will become a
significant load on the power grid [27], [3], which can lead to
undesirable effects such as voltage deviations if charging of
the vehicles are uncoordinated.
The key to reducing the impact of EVs on the power grid
is to coordinate their charging schedules, which is often cast
as a constrained optimization problem with the objective of
minimizing the peak load, power loss, or load variance [26],
[5]. Due to the large number of vehicles, computing an optimal
schedule for all vehicles can be very time consuming if the
computation is carried out on a centralized server that collects
demand information from users. Instead, it is more desirable
that the computation is distributed to individual users. Among
others, Ma et al. [19] proposed a distributed charging strategy
based on the notion of valley-filling charging profiles, which
is guaranteed to be optimal when all vehicles have identical
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(i.e., homogeneous) demand. Gan et al. [11] proposed a more
general algorithm that is optimal for nonhomogeneous demand
and allows asynchronous communication.
In order to solve the constrained optimization problem of
scheduling in a distributed manner, the server is required to
publish certain public information that is computed based
on the tentative demand collected from participating users.
Charging demand often contains private information of the
users. As a simple example, zero demand from a charging
station attached to a single home unit is a good indication
that the home owner is away from home. Note that the public
coordination signal is received by everyone including potential
adversaries whose goal is to decode private user information
from the public signal, so that it is desirable to develop
solutions for protecting user privacy.
It has been long recognized that ad hoc solutions such
as anonymization of user data are inadequate to guarantee
privacy due to the presence of public side information. A
famous case is the reidentification of certain users from
an anonymized dataset published by Netflix, which is an
American provider of on-demand Internet streaming media.
The dataset was provided for hosting an open competition
called the Netflix Prize for find the best algorithm to predict
user ratings on films. It has been reported that certain Netflix
subscribers can be identified from the anonymized Netflix
prize dataset through auxiliary information from the Internet
Movie Database (IMDb) [20]. As such, providing rigorous
solutions to preserving privacy has become an active area of
research. In the field of systems and control, recent work
on privacy includes, among others, filtering of streaming
data [18], smart metering [24], traffic monitoring [2], and
privacy in stochastic control [29].
Recently, the notion of differential privacy proposed by
Dwork and her collaborators has received attention due to its
mathematically rigorous formulation [8]. The original setting
assumes that the sensitive user information is held by a
trustworthy party (often called curator in related literature),
and the curator needs to answer external queries (about the
sensitive user information) that potentially come from an
adversary who is interested in learning information belonging
to some user. For example, in EV charging, the curator is
the central server that aggregates user information, and the
queries correspond to public coordination signals. Informally,
preserving differential privacy requires that the curator must
ensure that the results of the queries remain approximately
unchanged if data belonging to any single user are modified.
In other words, the adversary should know little about any
single user’s information from the results of queries. A recent
survey on differential privacy can be found in [7]; there is also
a recent textbook on this topic written by Dwork and Roth [9].
2Contributions: Motivated by the privacy concerns in EV
charging and recent advances in differential privacy, in this
paper, we investigate the problem of preserving differential
privacy in distributed constrained optimization. We present a
differentially private distributed algorithm for solving a class
of constrained optimization problems, whose privacy guaran-
tee is proved using the adaptive composition theorem. We
show that the private optimization algorithm can be viewed as
an implementation of stochastic gradient descent [22]. Based
on previous results on stochastic gradient descent [25], we are
able to derive a bound for the suboptimality of our algorithm
and reveal the trade-off between privacy and performance of
the algorithm.
We illustrate the applicability of this general framework
of differentially private distributed constrained optimization
in the context of EV charging. To this end, we begin by
computing the sensitivity of the public signal with respect to
changes in private information. Specifically, this requires ana-
lyzing the sensitivity of the projection operation onto the user-
specified constraints. Although such sensitivity can be difficult
to compute for a general problem, using tools in optimization
theory, we are able to derive an explicit expression of the
sensitivity for the EV charging example. Through numerical
simulations, we show that our algorithm is able to provide
strong privacy guarantees with little loss in performance when
the number of participating users (i.e., vehicles) is large.
Related work: There is a large body of research work on
incorporating differential privacy into resource allocation prob-
lems. A part of the work deals with indivisible resources (or
equivalently, games with discrete actions), including the work
by, among others, Kearns et al. [17], Rogers and Roth [23],
and Hsu et al. [13]. Our paper focuses on the case of divisible
resources and where private information is contained in the
constraints of the allocation problem.
In the work of differentially private resource allocation, it
is a common theme that the coordination signals are randomly
perturbed to avoid revealing private information of the users,
such as in the work by Huang et al. [15] and Hsu et
al. [14]. Huang et al. [15] study the problem of differentially
private convex optimization in the absence of constraints. In
their formulation, the private user information is encoded in
the individual cost functions and can be interpreted as user
preferences. Apart from incorporating constraints, a major
difference of our setting compared to Huang et al. [15] is
the way that privacy is incorporated into the optimization
problem. In Huang et al. [15], they assume that the public
coordination signals do not change when the individual cost
function changes. However, this assumption fails to hold, e.g.,
in the case of EV charging, where the coordination signal
is computed by aggregating the response from users and
hence is sensitive to changes in user information. Instead,
we treat the public coordination signals as the quantity that
needs to be perturbed (i.e., as a query, in the nomenclature of
differential privacy) in order to prevent privacy breach caused
by broadcasting the signals.
The recent work by Hsu et al. [14] on privately solving
linear programs is closely related to our work, since their
setting also assumes that the private information is contained
in the (affine) constraints. Our work can be viewed as a
generalization of their setting by extending the form of ob-
jective functions and constraints. In particular, the objective
function can be any convex function that depends on the
aggregate allocation and has Lipschitz continuous gradients.
The constraints can be any convex and separable constraints;
for illustration, we show how to implement the algorithm for a
particular set of affine constraints motivated by EV charging.
Paper organization: The paper is organized as follows.
Section II introduces the necessary background on (non-
private) distributed optimization and, in particular, projected
gradient descent. Section III reviews the results in differential
privacy and gives a formal problem statement of differentially
private distributed constrained optimization. Section IV gives
an overview of the main results of the paper. Section V
describes a differentially private distributed algorithm that
solves a general class of constrained optimization problems.
We also study the trade-off between privacy and performance
by analyzing the suboptimality of the differentially private
algorithm.
In Section VI, we illustrate the implementation of our
algorithm via a case study of EV charging. In particular, we
compute the sensitivity of the projection operation onto user-
specified constraints, which is required for implementing our
private algorithm. Section VII presents numerical simulations
on various aspects of the algorithm when being used in
practice, including choice of step size, number of iterations,
and the trade-off between privacy level and performance.
II. BACKGROUND: DISTRIBUTED CONSTRAINED
OPTIMIZATION
A. Notation
Denote the ℓp-norm of any x ∈ Rn by ‖x‖p. The subscript p
is dropped in the case of ℓ2-norm. For any nonempty convex
set C ⊂ Rn and x ∈ Rn, denote by ΠC(x) the projection
operator that projects x onto C in ℓ2-norm. Namely, ΠC(x) is
the solution of the following constrained least-squares problem
min.
xˆ
‖xˆ− x‖2 s.t. xˆ ∈ C. (1)
It can be shown that problem (1) is always feasible and
has a unique solution so that ΠC is well-defined. For any
function f (not necessarily convex), denote by ∂f(x) the set
of subgradients of f at x:
∂f(x) := {g : f(y) ≥ f(x) + gT (y − x) for all y}.
When f is convex and differentiable at x, the set ∂f(x)
becomes a singleton set whose only element is the gradient
∇f(x). For any function f , denote its range by range(f).
For any differentiable function f that depends on multiple
variables including x, denote by ∂xf the partial derivative
of f with respect to x. For any λ > 0, denote by Lap(λ)
the zero-mean Laplace probability distribution such that the
probability density function of a random variable X obeying
the distribution Lap(λ) is pX(x) = 12λ exp(−|x|/λ). The
vector consisting all ones is written as 1. The symbol  is
used to represent element-wise inequality: for any x, y ∈ Rn,
we have x  y if and only if xi ≤ yi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For
any positive integer n, we denote by [n] the set {1, 2, . . . , n}.
3Algorithm 1 Distributed projected gradient descent (with a
fixed number of iterations).
Input: U , {Ci}ni=1, K , and step sizes {αk}Kk=1.
Output: {r(K+1)i }ni=1.
Initialize {r(1)i }ni=1 arbitrarily. For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K , repeat:
1) Compute p(k) := ∇U
(∑n
i=1 r
(k)
i
)
.
2) For i ∈ [n], update r(k+1)i according to
r
(k+1)
i := ΠCi(r
(k)
i − αkp(k)). (3)
B. Distributed constrained optimization
Before discussing privacy issues, we first introduce the nec-
essary background on distributed constrained optimization. We
consider a constrained optimization problem over n variables
r1, r2, . . . , rn ∈ RT in the following form:
min.
{ri}ni=1
U (
∑n
i=1ri) (2)
s.t. ri ∈ Ci, i ∈ [n].
Throughout the paper, we assume that the objective func-
tion U : RT → R in problem (2) is differentiable and convex,
and its gradient ∇U is L-Lipschitz in the ℓ2-norm, i.e., there
exists L > 0 such that
‖∇U(x)−∇U(y)‖ ≤ L ‖x− y‖ for all x, y.
The set Ci is assumed to be convex for all i ∈ [n]. For
resource allocation problems, the variable ri and the constraint
set Ci are used to capture the allocation and constraints on the
allocation for user/agent i.
The optimization problem (2) can be solved iteratively using
projected gradient descent, which requires computation of
the gradient of U and its projection onto the feasible set
at each iteration. The computational complexity of projected
gradient descent is dominated by the projection operation and
grows with n. For practical applications, the number n can be
quite large, so that it is desirable to distribute the projection
operation to individual users. A distributed version of the
projected gradient descent method is shown in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm guarantees that the output converges to the
optimal solution as K → ∞ with proper choice of step
sizes {αk}Kk=1 (see [11] for details on how to choose αk).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Privacy in distributed constrained optimization
In many applications, the specifications of Ci may contain
sensitive information that user i wishes to keep undisclosed
from the public. In the framework of differential privacy,
it is assumed that an adversary can potentially collaborate
with some users in the database in order to learn about
other user’s information. Under this assumption, the distributed
projected descent algorithm (Algorithm 1) can lead to possible
loss of privacy of participating users for reasons described
below. It can be seen from Algorithm 1 that Ci affects r(k)i
through equation (3) and consequently also p(k). Since p(k)
is broadcast publicly to every charging station, with enough
side information (such as collaborating with some participating
users), an adversary who is interested in learning private
information about some user i may be able to infer information
about Ci from the public signals {p(k)}Kk=1. We will later
illustrate the privacy issues in the context of EV charging.
B. Differential privacy
Our goal is to modify the original distributed projected
gradient descent algorithm (Algorithm 1) to preserve dif-
ferential privacy. Before giving a formal statement of our
problem, we first present some preliminaries on differential
privacy. Differential privacy considers a set (called database)
D that contains private user information to be protected. For
convenience, we denote by D the universe of all possible
databases of interest. The information that we would like
to obtain from a database D is given by q(D) for some
mapping q (called query) that acts on D. In differential privacy,
preserving privacy is equivalent to hiding changes in the
database. Formally, changes in a database can be defined by a
symmetric binary relation between two databases called adja-
cency relation, which is denoted by Adj(·, ·); two databases D
and D′ that satisfy Adj(D,D′) are called adjacent databases.
Definition 1 (Adjacent databases). Two databases D =
{di}ni=1 and D′ = {d′i}ni=1 are said to be adjacent if there
exists i ∈ [n] such that dj = d′j for all j 6= i.
A mechanism that acts on a database is said to be differen-
tially private if it is able to ensure that two adjacent databases
are nearly indistinguishable from the output of the mechanism.
Definition 2 (Differential privacy [8]). Given ǫ ≥ 0, a
mechanism M preserves ǫ-differential privacy if for all R ⊆
range(M) and all adjacent databases D and D′ in D, it holds
that
P(M(D) ∈ R) ≤ eǫP(M(D′) ∈ R). (4)
The constant ǫ indicates the level of privacy: smaller ǫ
implies higher level of privacy. The notion of differential
privacy promises that an adversary cannot tell from the output
of M with high probability whether data corresponding to
a single user in the database have changed. It can be seen
that any non-constant differentially mechanism is necessarily
randomized, i.e., for a given database, the output of such a
mechanism obeys a certain probability distribution. Finally,
although it is not explicitly mentioned in Definition 2, a
mechanism needs to be an approximation of the query of
interest in order to be useful. For this purpose, a mechanism is
normally defined in conjunction with some query of interest;
a common notation is to include the query q of interest in the
subscript of the mechanism as Mq.
C. Problem formulation: Differentially private distributed
constrained optimization
Recall that our goal of preserving privacy in distributed
optimization is to protect the user information in Ci, even
if an adversary can collect all public signals {p(k)}Kk=1. To
4mathematically formulate our goal under the framework of dif-
ferential privacy, we define the database D as the set {Ci}ni=1
and the query as the K-tuple consisting of all the gradients
p = (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(K)). We assume that C1, C2, . . . , Cn
belong a family of sets parameterized by α ∈ Rs. Namely,
there exists a parameterized set C such that for all i ∈ [n], we
can write Ci = C(αi) for some αi ∈ Rs. We also assume that
there exists a metric ρ : Rs × Rs → R+. In this way, we can
define the distance ρC(Ci, C′i) between any Ci = C(αi) and
C′i = C(α′i) using the metric ρ as
ρC(Ci, C′i) := ρ(αi, α′i).
For any given δC ∈ R+, we define and use throughout
the paper the following adjacency relation between any two
databases D and D′ in the context of distributed constrained
optimization.
Definition 3 (Adjacency relation for constrained optimization).
For any databases D = {Ci}ni=1 and D′ = {C′i}ni=1, it holds
that Adj(D,D′) if and only if there exists i ∈ [n] such that
ρC(Ci, C′i) ≤ δC, and Cj = C′j for all j 6= i.
The constant δC is chosen based on the privacy requirement,
i.e., the kind of user activities that should be kept private.
Using the adjacency relation described in Definition 3, we
state in the following the problem of designing a differentially
private distributed algorithm for constrained optimization.
Problem 4 (Differentially private distributed constrained opti-
mization). Find a randomized mechanism Mp that approx-
imates the gradients p = (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(K)) (defined in
Algorithm 1) and preserves ǫ-differential privacy under the
adjacency relation described in Definition 3. Namely, for any
adjacent databases D and D′, and any R ⊆ range(Mp), the
mechanism Mp should satisfy
P(Mp(D) ∈ R) ≤ eǫP(Mp(D′) ∈ R).
D. Example application: EV charging
In EV charging, the goal is to charge n vehicles over a
horizon of T time steps with minimal influence on the power
grid. For simplicity, we assume that each vehicle belongs to
one single user. For any i ∈ [n], the vector ri ∈ RT represents
the charging rates of vehicle i over time. In the following, we
will denote by ri(t) the t-th component of ri. Each vehicle
needs to be charged a given amount of electricity Ei > 0
by the end of the scheduling horizon; in addition, for any
t ∈ [T ], the charging rate ri(t) cannot exceed the maximum
rate r¯i(t) for some given constant vector r¯i ∈ RT . Under these
constraints on ri, the set Ci is described as follows:
0  ri  r¯i, 1T ri = Ei. (5)
The tuple (r¯i, Ei) is called the charging specification of user
i. Throughout the paper, we assume that r¯i and Ei satisfy
1
T r¯i ≥ Ei for all i ∈ [n], (6)
so that the constraints (5) are always feasible.
The objective function U in problem (2) quantifies the
influence of a charging schedule {ri}ni=1 on the power grid.
We choose U as follows for the purpose of minimizing load
variance:
U (
∑n
i=1 ri) =
1
2
‖d+∑ni=1 ri/m‖2 . (7)
In (7), m is the number of households, which is assumed
proportional to the number of EVs, i.e., there exists γ such
that n/m = γ; then, the quantity
∑n
i=1 ri/m becomes the
aggregate EV load per household. The vector d ∈ RT is the
base load profile incurred by loads in the power grid other than
EVs, so that U (
∑n
i=1 ri) quantifies the variation of the total
load including the base load and EVs. It can be verified that U
is convex and differentiable, and ∇U is Lipschitz continuous.
The set Ci (defined by r¯i and Ei) can be associated with
personal activities of the owner of vehicle i in the following
way. For example, r¯i(t) = 0 may indicate that the owner is
temporarily away from the charging station (which may be
co-located with the owner’s residence) so that the vehicle is
not ready to be charged. Similarly, Ei = 0 may indicate that
the owner is not actively using the vehicle so that the vehicle
does not need to be charged.
We now illustrate why publishing the exact gradient p(k)
can potentially lead to a loss of privacy. The gradient p(k) can
be computed as p(k) = 1m (d +
∑n
i=1 ri/m). If an adversary
collaborates with all but one user i so that the adversary is
able obtain r(k)j for all j 6= i in the database. Then, the
adversary can infer r(k)i exactly from p(k), even though user i
did not reveal his r(k)i to the adversary. After obtaining r
(k)
i ,
the adversary can obtain information on Ci by, for example,
computing Ei = 1T r(k)i .
The adjacency relation in the case of EV charging is
defined as follows. Notice that, in the case of EV charging,
the parameter αi that parameterizes the set Ci is given by
αi = (r¯i, Ei), in which (r¯i, Ei) is the charging specifications
of user i as defined in (5).
Definition 5 (Adjacency relation for EV charging). For any
databases D = {Ci(r¯i, Ei)}ni=1 and D′ = {C′i(r¯′i, E′i)}ni=1, we
have Adj(D,D′) if and only if there exists i ∈ [n] such that
‖r¯i − r¯′i‖1 ≤ δr, |Ei − E′i| ≤ δE, (8)
and r¯j = r¯′j , Ej = E′j for all j 6= i.
In terms of choosing δE and δr, one useful choice for δE is
the maximum amount of energy an EV may need; this choice
of δE can be used to hide the event corresponding to whether
an user needs to charge his vehicle.
IV. OVERVIEW OF MAIN RESULTS
A. Results for general constrained optimization problems
In the first half of the paper, we present the main algorithmic
result of this paper, a differentially private distributed algo-
rithm (Algorithm 2) for solving the constrained optimization
problem (2). The constant ∆ that appears in the input of
Algorithm 2 is defined as
∆ := max
i∈[n]
max
{∥∥ΠCi(r) −ΠC′i(r)∥∥ :
r ∈ RT , Ci and C′i satisfy ρC(Ci, C′i) ≤ δC
}
. (9)
5Algorithm 2 Differentially private distributed projected gra-
dient descent.
Input: U , L, {Ci}ni=1, K , {αk}Kk=1, η ≥ 1, ∆, and ǫ.
Output: {rˆ(K+1)i }ni=1.
Initialize {r(1)i }ni=1 arbitrarily. Let rˆ(1)i = r(1)i for all i ∈ [n]
and θk = (η + 1)/(η + k) for k ∈ [K].
For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K , repeat:
1) If k = 1, then set wk = 0; else draw a random
vector wk ∈ RT from the distribution (proportional to)
exp
(
− 2ǫ‖wk‖K(K−1)L∆
)
2) Compute pˆ(k) := ∇U
(∑n
i=1 r
(k)
i
)
+ wk.
3) For i ∈ [n], compute:
r
(k+1)
i := ΠCi(r
(k)
i − αkpˆ(k)),
rˆ
(k+1)
i := (1− θk)rˆ(k)i + θkr(k+1)i .
In other words, ∆ can be viewed as a bound on the global
ℓ2-sensitivity of the projection operator ΠCi to changes in Ci
for all i ∈ [n]. Later, we will illustrate how to compute ∆
using the case of EV charging.
Compared to the (non-private) distributed algorithm (Al-
gorithm 1), the key difference in Algorithm 2 is the in-
troduction of random perturbations in the gradients (step
2) that convert p(k) into a noisy gradient pˆ(k). The noisy
gradients (pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(K)) can be viewed as a random-
ized mechanism Mp that approximates the original gradients
p = (p(1), p(2), . . . , p(K)). In Section V, we will prove that the
noisy gradients (as a mechanism) Mp := (pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(K))
preserve ǫ-differential privacy and hence solve Problem 4.
Theorem 6. Algorithm 2 ensures that Mp :=
(pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(K)) preserves ǫ-differential privacy under
the adjacency relation given by Definition 3.
Algorithm 2 can be viewed as an instance of stochas-
tic gradient descent that terminates after K iterations. We
will henceforth refer to Algorithm 2 as differentially private
distributed projected gradient descent. The step size αk is
chosen as αk = c/
√
k for some c > 0. The purpose
of the additional variables {rˆ(k)i }Kk=1 is to implement the
polynomial-decay averaging method in order to improve the
convergence rate, which is a common practice in stochastic
gradient descent [25]; introducing {rˆ(k)i }Kk=1 does not affect
privacy. The parameter η ≥ 1 is used for controlling the
averaging weight θk. Details on choosing η can be found in
Shamir and Zhang [25].
Like most iterative optimization algorithms, stochastic gra-
dient descent only converges in a probabilistic sense as the
number of iterations K → ∞. In practice, the number of
iterations is always finite, so that it is desirable to analyze
the suboptimality for a finite K . In Section V, we provide an
analysis on the expected suboptimality of Algorithm 2.
Theorem 7. The expected suboptimality of Algorithm 2 after
K iterations is bounded as follows:
E
[
U
(∑n
i=1 rˆ
(K+1)
i
)
− U∗
]
≤ O
(
η
√
nρ
(
G√
K
+
√
2TK3/2L∆
2ǫ
))
, (10)
where U∗ is the optimal value of problem (2), and
ρ = max
{√∑n
i=1 ‖ri‖2 : ri ∈ Ci, i ∈ [n]
}
,
G = max{‖∇U (∑ni=1 ri) ‖ : ri ∈ Ci, i ∈ [n]}.
B. Results for the case of EV charging
Having presented and analyzed the algorithm for a general
distributed constrained optimization problem, in the second
half of the paper, we illustrate how Algorithm 2 can be applied
to the case of EV charging. In Section VI, we demonstrate how
to compute ∆ using the case of EV charging as an example.
We show that ∆ can be bounded by δr and δE that appear
in (8) as described below.
Theorem 8. Consider the example of EV charging (as de-
scribed in Section III-D). For any i ∈ [n], the global ℓ2-
sensitivity of the projection operator ΠCi(r¯i,Ei) with respect
to changes in (r¯i, Ei) is bounded by
∆ ≤ 2δr + δE,
where δr and δE are specified in the adjacency relation given
by (8).
The suboptimality analysis given in Theorem 7 can be
further refined in the case of EV charging. The special form
of U given by (7) allows obtaining an upper bound on
suboptimality as given in Corollary 9 below.
Corollary 9. For the cost function U given by (7), the expected
suboptimality of Algorithm 2 is bounded as follows:
E
[
U
(∑n
i=1 rˆ
(K+1)
i
)
− U∗
]
≤ O
(
ηT 1/4(∆/nǫ)1/4
)
.
(11)
This upper bound shows the trade-off between privacy and
performance. As ǫ decreases, more privacy is preserved but at
the expense of increased suboptimality. On the other hand, this
increase in suboptimality can be mitigated by introducing more
participating users (i.e., by increasing n), which coincides with
the common intuition that it is easier to achieve privacy as the
number of users n increases.
V. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE DISTRIBUTED PROJECTED
GRADIENT DESCENT
In this section, we give the proof that the modified dis-
tributed projected gradient descent algorithm (Algorithm 2)
preserves ǫ-differential privacy. In the proof, we will exten-
sively use results from differential privacy such as the Laplace
mechanism and the adaptive sequential composition theorem.
6A. Review: Results from differential privacy
The introduction of additive noise in step 2 of Algorithm 2
is based on a variant of the widely used Laplace mechanism
in differential privacy. The Laplace mechanism operates by
introducing additive noise according to the ℓp-sensitivity (p ≥
1) of a numerical query q : D → Rm (for some dimension m),
which is defined as follows.
Definition 10 (ℓp-sensitivity). For any query q : D → Rm, the
ℓp-sensitivty of q under the adjacency relation Adj is defined
as
∆q := max{‖q(D)− q(D′)‖p :
D,D′ ∈ D s.t. Adj(D,D′)}.
Note that the ℓp-sensitivity of q does not depend on a specific
database D. In this paper, we will use the Laplace mechanism
for bounded ℓ2-sensitivity.
Proposition 11 (Laplace mechanism [8]). Consider a query
q : D → Rm whose ℓ2-sensitivity is ∆q. Define the mech-
anism Mq as Mq(D) := q(D) + w, where w is an m-
dimensional random vector whose probability density function
is given by pw(w) ∝ exp(−ǫ ‖w‖ /∆q). Then, the mechanism
Mq preserves ǫ-differential privacy.
As a basic building block in differential privacy, the Laplace
mechanism allows construction of the differentially private
distributed projected gradient descent algorithm described in
Algorithm 2 through adaptive sequential composition.
Proposition 12 (Adaptive seqential composition [9]). Con-
sider a sequence of mechanisms {Mk}Kk=1, in which the output
of Mk may depend on M1,M2, . . . ,Mk−1 as described below:
Mk(D) = Mk(D,M1(D),M2(D), . . . ,Mk−1(D)).
Suppose Mk(·, a1, a2, . . . , ak−1) preserves ǫk-differential pri-
vacy for any a1 ∈ range(M1), . . . , ak−1 ∈ range(Mk−1).
Then, the K-tuple mechanism M := (M1,M2, . . . ,MK)
preserves ǫ-differential privacy for ǫ =∑Kk=1 ǫk.
B. Proof on that Algorithm 2 preserves ǫ-differential privacy
Using the adaptive sequential composition theorem, we can
show that Algorithm 2 preserves ǫ-differential privacy. We can
view the K-tuple mechanism Mp := (pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(K)) as a
sequence of mechanisms {pˆ(k)}Kk=1. The key is to compute the
ℓ2-sensitivity of p(k) := ∇U
(∑n
i=1 r
(k)
i
)
, denoted by ∆(k),
when the outputs of pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(k−1) are given, so that we
can obtain a differentially private mechanism pˆ(k) by applying
the Laplace mechanism on p(k) according to ∆(k).
Lemma 13. In Algorithm 2, when the outputs of
pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(k−1) are given, the ℓ2-sensitivity of p(k) :=
∇U
(∑n
i=1 r
(k)
i
)
satisfies ∆(k) = (k − 1)L∆.
Proof: See Appendix I.
With Lemma 13 at hand, we now show that Algorithm 2
preserves ǫ-differential privacy (Theorem 6, Section IV).
Algorithm 3 Stochastic gradient descent with polynomial-
decay averaging.
Input: f , X , K , {αk}Kk=1, and η ≥ 1.
Output: xˆ(K+1).
Initialize x(1) and k = 1. Let xˆ(1) = x(1) and θk = (η +
1)/(η + k) for k ∈ [K].
For k = 1, 2, . . . ,K , repeat:
1) Compute an unbiased subgradient gˆk of f at x(k), i.e.,
E[gˆk] ∈ ∂f(x(k)).
2) Update x(k+1) := ΠX (x(k)−αkgˆk) and xˆ(k+1) := (1−
θk)xˆ
(k) + θkx
(k+1)
.
Proof: (of Theorem 6) For any k ∈ [K], when the outputs
of pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(k−1) are given, we know from Proposi-
tion 11 that pˆ(k) preserves ǫk-differential privacy, where ǫk
satisfies ǫ1 = 0 and for k > 1,
ǫk/∆
(k) =
2ǫ
K(K − 1)L∆ .
Use the expression of ∆(k) from Lemma 13 to obtain
ǫk =
2(k − 1)ǫ
K(K − 1) .
Using the adaptive sequential composition theorem, we know
that the privacy of Mp := (pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(K)) is given by∑K
k=1 ǫk =
2ǫ
K(K−1)
∑K
k=1(k − 1) = ǫ, which completes the
proof.
C. Suboptimality analysis: Privacy-performance trade-off
As a consequence of preserving privacy, we only have
access to noisy gradients {pˆ(k)}Kk=1 rather than the exact
gradients {p(k)}Kk=1. Recall that the additive noise wk in
step 2 of Algorithm 2 has zero mean. In other words, the
noisy gradient pˆ(k) is an unbiased estimate of p(k), which
allows us to view Algorithm 2 as an instantiation of stochastic
gradient descent. As we mentioned in Section IV, it is in fact
a variant of stochastic gradient descent that uses polynomial-
decay averaging for better convergence. The stochastic gradi-
ent descent method (with polynomial-decay averaging), which
is described in Algorithm 3, can be used for solving the
following optimization problem:
min.
x
f(x) s.t. x ∈ X ,
where x ∈ Rm and X ⊂ Rm for certain dimensions m.
Proposition 14 (due to Shamir and Zhang [25]) gives an upper
bound of the expected suboptimality after finitely many steps
for the stochastic gradient descent algorithm (Algorithm 3).
Proposition 14 (Shamir and Zhang [25]). Suppose X ⊂ Rm
is a convex set and f : Rm → R is a convex function. Assume
that there exist ρ and Ĝ such that supx,x′∈X ‖x− x′‖ ≤ ρ
and max1≤k≤K E ‖gˆk‖2 ≤ Ĝ2 for {gˆk}Kk=1 given by step 1
of Algorithm 3. If the step sizes are chosen as αk = c/
√
k for
some c > 0 , then for any K > 1, it holds that
E(f(xˆ(K+1))− f∗) ≤ O
(
η(ρ2/c+ cĜ2)√
K
)
, (12)
7where f∗ = infx∈X f(x).
A tighter upper bound can be obtained from (12) by
optimizing the right-hand side of (12) over the constant c.
Corollary 15. Under the same setting as Proposition 14, the
suboptimality bound for Algorithm 3 is given by
E(f(xˆ(K+1))− f∗) ≤ O
(
η
ρĜ√
K
)
, (13)
which is achieved by choosing c = ρ/Ĝ.
By applying Corollary 15, we are able obtain the bound of
suboptimality for Algorithm 2 as given by Theorem 7.
Proof: (of Theorem 7) In order to apply Corollary 15, we
need to compute ρ and Ĝ for Algorithm 2. The constant ρ can
be obtained as
ρ = max
{√∑n
i=1 ‖ri‖2 : ri ∈ Ci, i ∈ [n]
}
.
Recall that the definition of Ĝ is given by Ĝ2 :=
maxk E ‖gˆk‖2. It can be verified that the gradient gˆk of
the objective function U
(∑n
i=1 r
(k)
i
)
with respective to
(r
(k)
1 , r
(k)
2 , . . . , r
(k)
n ) is given by gˆk = [pˆ(k), pˆ(k), . . . , pˆ(k)],
which is formed by repeating pˆ(k) for n times, so that we
have Ĝ2 = n ·maxk E
∥∥pˆ(k)∥∥2. Using the expression of pˆ(k),
we have
Ĝ =
√
n · max
k∈[K]
√∥∥p(k)∥∥2 + E ‖wk‖2
≤ √n · max
k∈[K]
{
‖p(k)‖+
√
E ‖wk‖2
}
≤ √n(G+
√
2TK2L∆/2ǫ),
where in the last step we have used the fact that
E ‖wk‖2 = var ‖wk‖2 + (E ‖wk‖)2
= T (∆(k)/ǫk)
2 + T 2(∆(k)/ǫk)
2
≤ 2T 2(∆(k)/ǫk)2
and
∆(k)/ǫk =
K(K − 1)L∆
2ǫ
≤ K
2L∆
2ǫ
.
Substitute the expression of Ĝ into (13) to obtain the result.
As K increases, the first term in (10) decreases, whereas the
second term in (10) increases. It is then foreseeable that there
exists an optimal choice of K that minimizes the expected
suboptimality.
Corollary 16. The expected suboptimality of Algorithm 2 is
bounded as follows:
E
[
U
(∑n
i=1 rˆ
(K+1)
i
)
− U∗
]
≤ O
(
ηT 1/4n1/2ρ(G3L∆/ǫ)1/4
)
, (14)
where U∗, ρ, and G are given by Theorem 7. The bound (10)
is achieved by choosing K = (
√
2Gǫ/3TL∆)1/2.
Proof: The result can be obtained by optimizing the right-
hand side of (10) over K .
However, since it is generally impossible to obtain a tight
bound for ρ and Ĝ, optimizing K according to Corollary 16
usually does not give the best K in practice; numerical
simulation is often needed in order to find the best K for
a given problem. We will demonstrate how to choose K
optimally later using numerical simulations in Section VII.
VI. SENSITIVITY COMPUTATION: THE CASE OF EV
CHARGING
So far, we have shown that Algorithm 2 (specif-
ically, the mechanism Mp consisting of the gradients
(pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(K)) that are broadcast to every participating
user) preserves ǫ-differential privacy. The magnitude of the
noise wk introduced to the gradients depends on ∆, which is
the sensitivity of the projection operator ΠCi as defined in (9).
In order to implement Algorithm 2, we need to compute ∆
explicitly. In the next, we will illustrate how to compute ∆
using the case of EV charging as an example. We will give
an expression for ∆ that depends on the constants δr and δE
appearing in the adjacency relation (8). Since δr and δE are
part of the privacy requirement, one can choose ∆ accordingly
once the privacy requirement has been determined.
A. Overview
The input of Algorithm 2 includes the constant ∆ as
described by (9), which bounds the global ℓ2-sensitivity of
the projection operator ΠCi(r¯i,Ei) with respect to changes in
(r¯i, Ei). In this section, we will derive an explicit expression
of ∆ for the case of EV charging. Using tools in sensitivity
analysis of optimization problems, we are able to establish
the relationship between ∆ and the constants δr and δE that
appear in the adjacency relation (8) used in EV charging.
Recall that for any r ∈ RT , the output of the projection op-
eration ΠCi(r¯i,Ei)(r) is the optimal solution to the constrained
least-squares problem
min.
ri
1
2
‖ri − r‖2 (15)
s.t. 0  ri  r¯i, 1T ri = Ei.
Define the ℓ2-sensitivity for a fixed r as
∆r := max
i∈[n]
max
{∥∥ΠCi(r¯i.Ei)(r) −ΠCi(r¯′i,E′i)(r)∥∥ :
(r¯i, Ei) and (r¯′i, E′i) satisfy (8)
}
;
it can be verified that ∆ = maxr∈RT ∆r. In the following, we
will establish the relationship between ∆r and (δr, δE); we
will also show that ∆r does not depend on the choice of r,
so that ∆ = ∆r for any r ∈ RT . For notational convenience,
we consider the following least-squares problem:
min.
x
1
2
‖x− x0‖2 (16)
s.t. 0  x  a, 1Tx = b,
8where x0, a, and b are given constants. If we let
x0 = r0, a = r¯i, b = Ei,
then problem (16) is mapped back to problem (15). We also
have 1Ta ≥ b based on the assumption as described in (6).
Denote the optimal solution of problem (16) by x∗(a, b). Since
our purpose is to derive an expression for ∆r when r is fixed,
we also treat x0 as fixed and has dropped the dependence of
x∗ on x0. Our goal is to bound the global solution sensitivity
with respect to changes in a and b, i.e.,
‖x∗(a′, b′)− x∗(a, b)‖ , (17)
for any (a, b) and (a′, b′). We will proceed by first bounding
the local solution sensitivities ∂ax∗ and ∂bx∗ with respect to
a and b. Then, we will obtain a bound on the global solution,
sensitivity (17) through integration of ∂ax∗ and ∂bx∗.
B. Local solution sensitivity of nonlinear optimization prob-
lems
We begin by reviewing existing results on computing local
solution sensitivity of nonlinear optimization problems. Con-
sider a generic nonlinear optimization problem parametrized
by θ ∈ R described as follows:
min.
x∈Rn
f(x; θ) (18)
s.t. gi(x; θ) ≤ 0, i ∈ [p]
hj(x; θ) = 0, j ∈ [q],
whose Lagrangian can be expressed as
L(x, λ, ν; θ) = f(x; θ) +
p∑
i=1
λigi(x; θ) +
q∑
j=1
νjhj(x; θ),
where λ and ν are the Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints {gi}pi=1 and {hj}qj=1, respectively. If there exists
a set Θ ⊂ R such that the optimal solution is unique for
all θ ∈ Θ, then the optimal solution of problem (18) can be
defined as a function x∗ : Θ → Rn. This condition on the
uniqueness of optimal solution holds for problem (16), since
the objective function therein is strictly convex.
Denote by λ∗ and ν∗ the optimal Lagrange multipliers.
Under certain conditions described in Proposition 17 below,
the partial derivatives ∂θx∗, ∂θλ∗, and ∂θν∗ exist; these partial
derivatives will also be referred to as local solution sensitivity
of problem (18).
Proposition 17 (Fiacco [10]). Let (x∗, λ∗, ν∗) be the primal-
dual optimal solution of problem (18). Suppose the following
conditions hold.
1) x∗ is a locally unique optimal primal solution.
2) The functions f , {gi}pi=1, and {hj}qj=1 are twice con-
tinuously differentiable in x and differentiable in θ.
3) The gradients {∇gi(x∗) : gi(x∗) = 0, i ∈ [p]} of the
active constraints and the gradients {∇hj(x∗) : j ∈ [q]}
are linearly independent.
4) Strict complementary slackness holds: λ∗i > 0 when
gi(x
∗, θ) = 0 for all i ∈ [p].
Then the local sensitivity (∂θx∗, ∂θλ∗, ∂θν∗) of prob-
lem (18) exists and is continuous in a neighborhood of θ.
Moreover, (∂θx∗, ∂θλ∗, ∂θν∗) is uniquely determined by the
following:
∇2L · ∂θx∗ +
p∑
i=1
∇gi · ∂θλ∗i +
q∑
j=1
∇hj · ∂θν∗j + ∂θ(∇L) = 0
and
λi∇gi · ∂θx∗ + gi∂θλ∗i + λ∗i ∂θgi = 0, i ∈ [p]
∇hj · ∂θx∗ + ∂θhj = 0, j ∈ [q].
C. Solution sensitivity of the distributed EV charging problem
We begin by computing the local solution sensitivities ∂ax∗
and ∂bx∗ for problem (16) using Proposition 17. After ∂ax∗
and ∂bx∗ are obtained, the global solution sensitivity (17) can
be obtained through integration of the local sensitivity. For
convenience, we compute the global solution sensitivity in a
and b separately and combine the results in the end in the
proof of Theorem 8.
One major difficulty in applying Proposition 17 is that it
requires strict complementary slackness, which unfortunately
does not hold for all values of a and b. We will proceed by
deriving the local solution sensitivities assuming that strict
complementary slackness holds. Later, we will show that strict
complementary slackness only fails at finitely many locations
on the integration path, so that the integral remains unaffected.
We shall proceed by computing the solution sensitivity for
a and b separately. First of all, we assume that a is fixed and
solve for the global solution sensitivity of x∗ in b, defined as
‖x∗(a, b′)− x∗(a, b)‖ . (19)
When strict complementary slackness holds, the following
lemma gives properties of the local solution sensitivity of
problem (16) with respect to b.
Lemma 18 (Local solution sensitivity in b). When strict
complementary slackness holds, the local solution sensitivity
∂bx
∗ of problem (16) satisfies
∂bx
∗  0 and 1T∂bx∗ = 1.
Proof: See Appendix II-A.
The following lemma shows that the condition is only
violated for a finite number of values of b, so that it will
still be possible to obtain the global sensitivity (19) through
integration.
Lemma 19. The set of possible values of b in problem (16)
for which strict complementary slackness fails to hold is finite.
Proof: See Appendix II-B.
The implication of Lemma 19 is that the local solution
sensitivity ∂bx∗ exists everywhere except at finitely many
location. It is also possible to show that the optimal solution
x∗(a, b) is continuous in b (cf. Berge [1, page 116], Dantzig
et al. [4], or Tropp et al. [28, Appendix I]); the continuity of
x∗(a, b) in b and together with Lemma 19 imply that ∂bx∗ is
Riemann integrable so that we can obtain the global solution
sensitivity through integration.
9Proposition 20 (Global solution sensivitity in b). For any a,
b and b′ that satisfy 1Ta ≥ b and 1Ta ≥ b′, we have
‖x∗(a, b′)− x∗(a, b)‖1 = |b′ − b|.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume b′ > b. Since
x∗(a, b) is continuous in b, and the partial derivative ∂bx∗
exists except at finitely many points according to Lemma 19,
we know that ∂bx∗i is Riemann integrable for all i ∈ [T ], so
that
x∗i (a, b
′)− x∗i (a, b) =
∫ b′
b
∂bx
∗
i (a, b) db
according to the fundamental theorem of calculus. Using the
fact ∂bx∗i ≥ 0 as given by Lemma 18, we have
x∗i (a, b
′)− x∗i (a, b) ≥ 0.
Then, we have
‖x∗(a, b′)− x∗(a, b)‖1 =
T∑
i=1
|x∗i (a, b′)− x∗i (a, b)|
=
T∑
i=1
(x∗i (a, b
′)− x∗i (a, b)) =
∫ b′
b
1
T∂bx
∗(a, b) db.
Using the fact 1T∂bx∗ = 1 given by Lemma 18, we obtain
‖x∗(a, b′)− x∗(a, b)‖1 = b′ − b = |b′ − b|.
Having computed the solution sensitivity in b, we now
assume that b is fixed and solve for the global solution
sensitivity of x∗ in a, defined as
‖x∗(a′, b)− x∗(a, b)‖ . (20)
When strict complementary slackness holds, the following
lemma gives properties of the local solution sensitivity of
problem (16) with respect to a.
Lemma 21 (Local solution sensivitity in a). When strict
complementary slackness holds, the local solution sensitivity
∂ax
∗ of problem (16) satisfies
T∑
i=1
‖∂aix∗‖1 ≤ 2.
Proof: See Appendix II-C.
Similar to computing the sensitivity in b, we can obtain
the global solution sensitivity in a by integration of the local
sensitivity. For convenience, we choose the integration path L
from any a to a′ such that only one component of a is varied
at a time. Namely, the path L is given by
L : (a1, a2, . . . , aT )→ (a′1, a2, . . . , aT )→ · · ·
→ (a′1, a′2, . . . , a′T ). (21)
For convenience, we also define the subpaths L1, L2, . . . , LT
such that
Li : (a
′
1, . . . , a
′
i−1, ai, . . . , aT )→ (a′1, . . . , a′i−1, a′i, . . . , aT ).
(22)
It is also possible to establish the fact that ∂ax∗ exists
excepts for a finite number of locations along the integration
path L. Note that we do not need to check whether strict
complementary slackness holds for the constraint xi ≥ 0, since
in this case ∂aix∗ always exists (in fact, ∂aix∗ = 0); instead,
we only need to check strict complementary slackness
µ∗i > 0 when x∗i = ai for all i (23)
associated with the constraint x  a.
Lemma 22. When constrained on the integration path L given
by (21), the set of possible values of a in problem (16) for
which the strict complementary slackness condition (23) fails
to hold is finite.
Proof: See Appendix II-D.
Lemma 22 guarantees that ∂ax∗ is Riemann integrable
along L, so that we can obtain the global solution sensitiv-
ity (20) through integration.
Proposition 23 (Global solution sensivitity in a). For any
given a, a′, and b that satisfy 1Ta ≥ b and 1Ta′ ≥ b, we
have
‖x∗(a′, b)− x∗(a, b)‖1 ≤ 2 ‖a′ − a‖1 .
Proof: Similar to the proof of Proposition 20, we can
show that ∂ax∗i is Riemann integrable using both Lemma 22
and the fact that x∗ is continuous in a. Then, we can define
Iij :=
∫
Lj
∂ax
∗
i (a, b) · dℓ,
which is the line integral of the vector field ∂ajx∗i (·, b) along
the path Lj . Define xaij := ∂ajx∗i (·, b). Using the definition of
Lj as given by (22), we can write Iij as
Iij =
∫ a′j
aj
xaij(a
′
1, a
′
2, . . . , a
′
j−1, aj, . . . , aT ) daj .
Then, we have
x∗i (a
′, b)− x∗i (a, b) =
∫
L
∂ax
∗
i (a, b) · dℓ =
T∑
j=1
Iij
and consequently
|x∗i (a′, b)− x∗i (a, b)| ≤
T∑
j=1
|Iij |.
Substituting the expression of |x∗i (a′, b) − x∗i (a, b)| into the
the global sensitivity expression (20), we obtain
‖x∗(a′, b)− x∗(a, b)‖1 =
T∑
i=1
|x∗i (a′, b)− x∗i (a, b)|
≤
T∑
i=1
T∑
j=1
|Iij | =
T∑
j=1
T∑
i=1
|Iij |. (24)
Note that we have
|Iij | ≤
∫ a¯j
aj
∣∣xaij(a′1, . . . , a′j−1, aj , . . . , aT )∣∣ daj ,
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where aj := min(aj , a′j) and a¯j := max(aj , a′j), so that
T∑
i=1
|Iij | ≤
T∑
i=1
∫ a¯j
aj
∣∣xaij(a′1, . . . , a′j−1, aj , . . . , aT )∣∣ daj
=
∫ a¯j
aj
T∑
i=1
∣∣xaij(a′1, . . . , a′j−1, aj , . . . , aT )∣∣ daj
=
∫ a¯j
aj
∥∥∂ajx∗((a′1, . . . , a′j−1, aj , . . . , aT ), b)∥∥1 daj
:= I¯j .
Using Lemma 21, we can show that I¯j satisfies
I¯j ≤
∫ a¯j
aj
2 daj = 2|a′j − aj |.
Substitute the above into (24) to obtain
‖x∗(a′, b)− x∗(a, b)‖1 ≤ 2
T∑
j=1
|a′j − aj | = 2 ‖a′ − a‖1 ,
which completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 8 using results from
Propositions 20 and 23.
Proof: (of Theorem 8) Consider problem (16). By com-
bining Propositions 20 and 23, we can obtain the global
solution sensitivity with respect to both a and b as defined
by (17). Consider any given (a, b) and (a′, b′) that satisfy
1
Ta ≥ b and 1Ta′ ≥ b′. Without loss of generality, we assume
that 1Ta′ ≥ 1Ta, so that 1Ta′ ≥ b; this implies that the
corresponding optimization problem(16) is feasible, and the
optimal solution x∗(a′, b) is well-defined. Then, we have
‖x∗(a′, b′)− x∗(a, b)‖1
= ‖x∗(a′, b′)− x∗(a′, b) + x∗(a′, b)− x∗(a, b)‖1
≤ ‖x∗(a′, b′)− x∗(a′, b)‖1 + ‖x∗(a′, b)− x∗(a, b)‖1
≤ ‖b′ − b‖1 + 2 ‖a′ − a‖1 . (25)
By letting x0 = r0, a = r¯i, and b = Ei, we can map
problem (16) back to problem (15). Recall that x∗ is defined as
the optimal solution of problem (16) for a given x0. Then, the
inequality (25) implies that for any given r, the ℓ2-sensitivity
∆r ≤ 2 ‖r¯′i − r¯i‖1 + ‖E′i − Ei‖1 = 2δr + δE.
However, since the right-hand side of the above inequality
does not depend on r, we have
∆ = max
r∈RT
∆r ≤ 2δr + δE,
which completes the proof.
Remark 24. Alternatively, one may use the fact ΠCi(·) ∈ Ci
to obtain a bound on ∆. Recall that for any ri ∈ Ci we have
‖ri‖ ≤ ‖r¯i‖ and ‖ri‖ ≤ ‖rˆ‖1 = Ei.
Then, we have
∆ ≤ max
i∈[n]
(‖r¯i‖+ ‖r¯′i‖) ≤ 2max
i∈[n]
‖r¯i‖+ δr
and
∆ ≤ max
i∈[n]
(Ei + E
′
i) ≤ 2max
i∈[n]
Ei + δE.
However, this bound can be quite loose in practice. Since the
magnitude of wk in Algorithm 2 is proportional to ∆, a loose
bound on ∆ implies introducing more noise to the gradi-
ent p(k) than what is necessary for preserving ǫ-differential
privacy. As we have already seen in Section (VI-D), the
noise magnitude is closely related to the performance loss of
Algorithm 2 caused by preserving privacy, and less noise is
always desired for minimizing such a loss.
D. Revisited: Suboptimality analysis
The bound (14) given by Corollary 16 does not clearly
indicate the dependence of suboptimality on the number of
participating users n, because ρ, G, and L also depend on
n. In order to reveal the dependence on n, we will further
refine the suboptimality bound (14) for the specific objective
function U given in (7). The resulting suboptimality bound is
shown in Corollary 9.
Proof: (of Corollary 9) Define rmax = maxi∈[n] ‖ri‖ .
Then, we have ρ ≤ √nrmax. For U given by (7), its gradient
can be computed as
∇U (∑ni=1 ri) = 1m (d+∑ni=1 ri/m) ,
so that
‖∇U (∑ni=1 ri)‖ ≤ 1m (‖d‖+∑ni=1 ‖ri‖/m) .
Then, we obtain
G := max{‖∇U (∑ni=1 ri) ‖ : ri ∈ Ci, i ∈ [n]}.
≤ 1
m
(‖d‖+ nrmax/m)
=
γ
n
(‖d‖+ γrmax) .
In order to compute the Lipschitz constant L for ∇U , note
that for any x, y ∈ RT , we have
‖∇U(x)−∇U(y)‖ = 1
m
‖x/m− y/m‖ = 1
m2
‖x− y‖ ,
so that we obtain L = 1/m2 = γ2/n2. Substitute ρ, G, and
L into (14) to obtain (11). Note that we have dropped the
dependence on d, rmax, and γ for brevity, since we are most
interested in the relationship between suboptimality and (n, ǫ).
The suboptimality bound (11) indicates how performance
(cost) is affected by incorporating privacy. As ǫ decreases, the
level of privacy is elevated but at the expense of sacrificing
performance as a result of increased suboptimality. This in-
crease in suboptimality can be mitigated by introducing more
participating users (i.e., by increasing n) as predicted by the
bound (11); this coincides with the common intuition that it is
easier to achieve privacy as the number of users n increases
when only aggregate user information is available. Indeed, in
the distributed EV charging algorithm, the gradients p(k) is a
function of the aggregate load profile
∑n
i=1 r
(k)
i .
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VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
We consider the cost function as given by (7). The base load
d is chosen according to the data provided in Gan et al. [11].
The scheduling horizon is divided into 52 time slots of 15
minutes. We consider a large pool of EVs (n = 100, 000)
in a large residential area (m = 500, 000). For computa-
tional efficiency, instead of assigning a different charging
specification (r¯i, Ei) to every user i ∈ [n], we divide the
users into N (N ≪ n) groups and assign the same charging
specification for every user in the same group. If we choose the
same initial conditions r(1)i for all users in the same group,
the projected gradient descent update (step 3, Algorithm 2)
becomes identical for all users in the group, so that the
projection ΠCi only needs to be computed once for a given
group. We choose N = 100 and draw (r¯j , Ej) for all j ∈ [N ]
as follows. The entries of r¯j are drawn independently from a
Bernoulli distribution, where r¯j(t) = 3.3 kW with probability
0.5 and r¯j(t) = 0 kW with probability 0.5. The amount
of energy Ej is drawn from the uniform distribution on the
interval [28, 40] (kW). Note that Ej has been normalized
against ∆T = 0.25 h to match the unit of r¯j ; in terms of
energy required, this implies that each vehicle needs an amount
between [28, 40] kW× 0.25 h = [7, 10] kWh by the end of the
scheduling horizon.
The constants δr and δE in the adjacency relation (8) are
determined as follows. We choose δr = 3.3×4 = 13.2 kW, so
that the privacy of any events spanning less than 4 time slots
(i.e., 1 hour) can be preserved; we choose δE = 40 − 28 =
12 kW, which corresponds to the maximum difference in Ej
(j ∈ [N ]) as Ej varies between the interval [28, 40] (kW).
The other parameters in Algorithm 2 are chosen as follows:
L = 1/m2 (as computed in Section VI-D), η = 1, whereas ǫ,
K , and c will vary among different numerical experiments.
Fig. 1 plots a typical output from Algorithm 2 with ǫ = 0.1,
alongside the optimal solution of problem (2). The dip at
t = 34 that appears both in the differentially private solution
and the optimal solution is due to the constraint imposed by
r¯i(t). Because of the noise introduced in the gradients, the
differentially private solution given by Algorithm 2 exhibits
some additional fluctuations compared to the optimal solution.
The constant c that determines the step sizes is found to be in-
sensitive for c ∈ [10, 20] as shown in Fig. 2, so that we choose
c = 10 in all subsequent simulations. In Fig. 2, the relative
suboptimality is defined as
[
U
(∑n
i=1 rˆ
(K+1)
i
)
− U∗
]
/U∗,
which is obtained by normalizing the suboptimality against
U∗.
Fig. 3 shows the relative suboptimality as a function of K .
It can be seen from Fig. 3 that an optimal choice of K exists,
which coincides with the result of Theorem 7.
Fig. 4 shows the dependence of the relative suboptimality
on ǫ. A separate experiment for investigating the dependence
on n is not performed, since changing n is expected to have
a similar effect as changing ǫ according to Corollary 9. As
the privacy requirement becomes less stringent (i.e., as ǫ
grows), the suboptimality of Algorithm 2 improves, which
coincides qualitatively with the bound given in Corollary 9.
One can quantify the relationship between the suboptimality
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Figure 1. A typical output of the differentially private distributed EV charging
algorithm (Algorithm 2) with ǫ = 0.1 compared to the optimal solution of
problem (2). The other parameters used in the simulation are: K = 6 and
c = 10.
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Figure 2. Relative suboptimality of the differentially private distributed EV
charging algorithm (Algorithm 2) as a function of the step size constant c.
The other parameters used in the simulations are: ǫ = 0.1 and K = 6.
and ǫ from the slope of the curve in Fig. 4; if the slope is
s, then the relationship between the suboptimality and ǫ is
given by O(ǫs). By performing linear regression on the curve
in Fig. 4, we can obtain the slope as s ≈ −0.698, which is
in contrast to −0.25 given by Corollary 9. This implies that
the suboptimality of Algorithm 2 decreases faster than the rate
given by Corollary 9 as ǫ increases. In other words, the bound
given by Corollary 9 is likely to be loose; this is possibly due
to the fact that the result on the suboptimality of stochastic
gradient descent (Proposition 14) does not consider additional
properties of the objective function such as strong convexity.
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Figure 3. Relative suboptimality of the differentially private distributed EV
charging algorithm (Algorithm 2) as a function of the number of iterations K .
The other parameters used in the simulations are: ǫ = 0.1 and c = 10.
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Figure 4. Relative suboptimality of Algorithm 2 as a function of ǫ. Larger ǫ
implies that less privacy is preserved. The slope is approximately −0.698
(compared to the theoretical bound −0.25 as given by Corollary 9). All
simulations use c = 10. The number of iterations K is optimized for every
choice of ǫ.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This paper develops an ǫ-differentially private algorithm for
distributed constrained optimization. The algorithm preserves
privacy in the specifications of user constraints by adding
noise to the public coordination signal (i.e., gradients). By
using the sequential adaptive composition theorem, we show
that the noise magnitude is determined by the sensitivity of
the projection operation ΠC , where C is the parameterized
set describing the user constraints. By viewing the projection
operation as a least-squares problem, we are able to compute
the sensitivity of ΠC through a solution sensitivity analysis of
optimization problems. We demonstrate how this sensitivity
can be computed in the case of EV charging.
We also analyze the trade-off between privacy and per-
formance of the algorithm through results on suboptimality
analysis of the stochastic gradient descent method. Specifi-
cally, in the case of EV charging, the expected suboptimality
of the ǫ-differentially private optimization algorithm with n
participating users is upper bounded by O((nǫ)−1/4). For
achieving the best suboptimality, both the suboptimality analy-
sis and numerical simulations show that there exists an optimal
choice for the number iterations: too few iterations affects the
convergence behavior, whereas too many iterations leads to
too much noise in the gradients. Simulations have indicated
that the bound O((nǫ)−1/4) is likely not tight. One future
direction is to derive a tighter bound for similar distributed
optimization problems using information-theoretic approaches
(e.g., [6], [21]).
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 13
Consider any adjacent D and D′ such that Cj = C′j for
all j 6= i. We will first show that when the outputs of
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pˆ(1), pˆ(2), . . . , pˆ(k−1) are given, we have∥∥∥r(k)i (D′)− r(k)i (D)∥∥∥ ≤ (k − 1)∆,∥∥∥r(k)j (D′)− r(k)j (D)∥∥∥ = 0, ∀j 6= i.
We will prove the above result by induction. For k = 1, we
have
∥∥∥r(1)i (D′)− r(1)i (D)∥∥∥ = 0 for all i ∈ [n].
Consider the case when k > 1. For notational convenience,
we define for i ∈ [n],
v
(k−1)
i (D) := r
(k−1)
i (D)− αk−1pˆ(k−1). (26)
In (26), we have used the fact that the output of pˆ(k−1) is given
so that the dependence of pˆ(k−1) on D is dropped according to
the adaptive sequential composition theorem (Proposition 12).
Then, for all j 6= i, we have∥∥∥r(k)j (D′)− r(k)j (D)∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥ΠC′
j
(v
(k−1)
j (D
′))−ΠCj (v(k−1)j (D))
∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥ΠCj (v(k−1)j (D′))−ΠCj (v(k−1)j (D))∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥v(k−1)j (D′)− v(k−1)j (D)∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥r(k−1)j (D′)− r(k−1)j (D)∥∥∥ = 0
and ∥∥∥r(k)i (D′)− r(k)i (D)∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥ΠC′
i
(v
(k−1)
i (D
′))−ΠCi(vk−1)i (D))
∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥ΠC′
i
(v
(k−1)
i (D
′))−ΠCi(vk−1)i (D′))
∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥ΠCi(v(k−1)i (D′))−ΠCi(vk−1)i (D))∥∥∥
≤ ∆+
∥∥∥v(k−1)i (D′)− v(k−1)i (D)∥∥∥
= ∆+
∥∥∥r(k−1)i (D′)− r(k−1)i (D)∥∥∥ ≤ (k − 1)∆,
where we have used the induction hypothesis∥∥∥r(k−1)i (D′)− r(k−1)i (D)∥∥∥ ≤ (k − 2)∆,∥∥∥r(k−1)j (D′)− r(k−1)j (D)∥∥∥ = 0, ∀j 6= i.
Then, the ℓ2-sensitivity of p(k) can be computed as follows:∥∥∥p(k)(D′)− p(k)(D)∥∥∥
≤ L
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
[
r
(k)
i (D
′)− r(k)i (D)
]∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ L(k − 1)∆.
Since the above results hold for all i such that D and D′
satisfy Cj = C′j for all j 6= i, we have
∆(k) := max
D,D′ : Adj(D,D′)
∥∥∥p(k)(D′)− p(k)(D)∥∥∥
= max
i∈[n]
max
{∥∥∥p(k)(D′)− p(k)(D)∥∥∥ : D,D′ satisfy
Cj = C′j for all j 6= i
}
= L(k − 1)∆.
APPENDIX II
PROOFS ON THE LOCAL SOLUTION SENSITIVITIES
A. Proof of Lemma 18
The Lagrangian of problem (16) can be written as
L(x, λ, µ, ν) =
1
2
‖x− x0‖2−λTx+µT (x−a)+ν(b−1Tx).
(27)
Denote by λ∗, µ∗, and ν∗ the corresponding optimal Lagrange
multipliers. It can be verified that all conditions in Proposi-
tion 17 hold. Apply Proposition 17 to obtain
∂bx
∗ − ∂bλ∗ + ∂bµ∗ − ∂bν∗ · 1 = 0 (28)
1
T∂bx
∗ = 1 (29)
λ∗i · ∂bx∗i + x∗i · ∂bλ∗i = 0, i ∈ [T ] (30)
µ∗i · ∂bx∗i + (x∗i − ai) · ∂bµ∗i = 0, i ∈ [T ]. (31)
Strict complementary slackness implies that either (1) x∗i = 0
and λ∗i > 0, so that ∂bx∗i = 0 according to (30); or (2) x∗i 6= 0
and λ∗i = 0, so that ∂bλ∗i = 0 also according to (30). In other
words, under strict complementary slackness, condition (30)
is equivalent to
∂bλ
∗
i · ∂bx∗i = 0. (32)
Similarly, we can rewrite condition (31) as
∂bµ
∗
i · ∂bx∗i = 0. (33)
Conditions (32) and (33) imply that one and only one of the
following is true for any i ∈ [T ]: (1) ∂bx∗i = 0; (2) ∂bλ∗i = 0
and ∂bµ∗i = 0. Define I := {i : ∂bx∗i 6= 0}, and we have∑
i∈I
∂bx
∗
i = 1 (34)
from (29). Note that (28) implies that for all i, j ∈ [T ],
∂bx
∗
i − ∂bλ∗i + ∂bµ∗i = ∂bx∗j − ∂bλ∗j + ∂bµ∗j .
Since ∂bλ∗i = 0 and ∂bµ∗i = 0 for all i ∈ I, we have ∂bx∗i =
∂bx
∗
j for all i, j ∈ I and hence ∂bx∗i = 1/|I| for all i ∈ I
according to (34). On the other hand, from the definition of
I, we have ∂bx∗i = 0 for all i /∈ I. In summary, we have
∂bx
∗  0, which complete the proof.
B. Proof of Lemma 19
The optimality conditions for problem (16) imply that
x∗ − λ∗ + µ∗ − ν∗1 = x0 (35)
1
Tx∗ = b (36)
λ∗i x
∗
i = 0, i ∈ [T ] (37)
µ∗i (x
∗
i − ai) = 0, i ∈ [T ]. (38)
Suppose strict complementary slackness fails for a certain
value of b. Denote the set of indices of the constraints that
violate strict complementary slackness by Iλ := {i : λ∗i =
0, x∗i = 0} and Iµ := {i : µ∗i = 0, x∗i = ai}. If both Iλ and
Iµ are empty, then strict complementary slackness holds for
all constraints.
Proof: When Iλ is non-empty, we know from (38) that
µ∗i = 0 for all i ∈ Iλ. For any i ∈ Iλ, substitute x∗i = 0,
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λ∗i = 0, and µ∗i = 0 into (35) to obtain ν∗ = x0,i. For any
other j /∈ Iλ, one of the following three cases must hold: (1)
x∗j = 0; (2) x∗j = aj ; (3) 0 < x∗j < aj . Consider a partition
(I1, I2, I3) of the set [n]\Iλ as follows:
I1 := {j : x∗j = 0}, I2 := {j : x∗j = aj},
I3 := {j : 0 < x∗j < aj}.
For any j ∈ I3, we have λ∗j = µ∗j = 0 from (30) and (31), so
that we have x∗j = ν∗ + x0,j according to (28). Then, we can
write using (36)
b = 1Tx∗
=
∑
i∈Iλ
x∗i +
∑
j∈I1
x∗j +
∑
j∈I2
x∗j +
∑
j∈I3
x∗j
= |Iλ|ν∗ + 0 +
∑
j∈I2
aj +
∑
j∈I3
(ν∗ + x0,j). (39)
Since both a and x0 are fixed, we know that the choice of
ν∗ = x0,i (for any i ∈ Iλ) is finite. By enumerating all finitely
many partitions (Iλ, I1, I2, I3) of [T ], we know that b can
only take finitely many values according to (39). The proof
is similar for the case when Iµ is nonempty by making use
of (37). When both Iλ and Iµ are nonempty, the possible
values of b are given by the intersection of those when only
one of Iλ and Iµ is empty; hence the number of possible
values is also finite.
C. Proof of Lemma 21
Similar to the proof of Lemma 18, we apply Proposition 17
using the Lagrangian as given by (27). We can show that the
following holds for all i ∈ [T ]:
∂aix
∗
i − ∂aiλ∗i + ∂aiµ∗i − ∂aiν∗ = 0 (40)
∂ajx
∗
i − ∂ajν∗ = 0, ∀j 6= i (41)
λ∗i ∂ajx
∗
i + x
∗
i ∂ajλ
∗
i = 0, ∀j ∈ [T ] (42)
µ∗i ∂ajx
∗
i + (x
∗
i − ai)∂ajµ∗i − µ∗i = 0 (43)
µ∗i ∂ajx
∗
i + (x
∗
i − ai)∂ajµ∗i = 0, ∀j 6= i (44)
n∑
j=1
∂aix
∗
j = 0. (45)
From (40) and (41), we know that the following holds for all
i:
∂aiν
∗ = ∂aix
∗
i − ∂aiλ∗i + ∂aiµ∗i = ∂aix∗j , ∀j 6= i. (46)
The first equality in (46) implies that there exists a constant Ci
such that ∂aix∗j = Ci for all j 6= i. Then, we can rewrite (45)
as
∂aix
∗
i + (T − 1)Ci = 0, ∀i ∈ [T ], (47)
which implies that
‖∂aix∗‖1 =
T∑
j=1
|∂aix∗j | = |∂aix∗i |+
∑
j 6=i
|∂aix∗j |
= 2(T − 1)|Ci|. (48)
Suppose strict complementary slackness holds. Then, for any
i ∈ [T ], only one of the three following cases holds:
1) x∗i = 0, λ∗i > 0, µ∗i = 0;
2) x∗i = ai, λ∗i = 0, µ∗i > 0;
3) 0 < x∗i < ai, λ∗i = 0, µ∗i = 0.
In the next, we will derive the expression of ‖∂aix∗‖1 for the
three cases separately:
1) x∗i = 0, λ∗i > 0, µ∗i = 0:
Using (42), we obtain ∂ajx∗i = 0 for all j ∈ [T ]; in
particular, this implies ∂aix∗i = 0. Substituting ∂aix∗i =
0 into (47), we obtain Ci = 0, so that ‖∂aix∗‖1 = 0
according to (48).
2) x∗i = ai, λ∗i = 0, µ∗i > 0:
Using (43), we obtain ∂aix∗i = 1; substitute this
into (47) to obtain Ci = − 1T−1 , so that we have
‖∂aix∗‖1 = 2 according to (48).
3) 0 < x∗i < ai, λ∗i = 0, µ∗i = 0:
Using (42)–(44), we obtain ∂ajλ∗i = ∂ajµ∗i = 0 for all
j ∈ [T ]; in particular, this implies ∂aiλ∗i = ∂aiµ∗i =
0. Then, using (46), we have ∂aix∗i = Ci; substitute
this into (47) to obtain Ci = 0, so that ‖∂aix∗‖1 = 0
according to (48).
For case 2 in the above, the fact that ∂aix∗j = Ci = − 1T−1 6= 0
for all j 6= i also implies that x∗j 6= aj for all j 6= i. Otherwise,
the fact x∗j = aj would imply µ∗j > 0 as a result of strict
complementary slackness. According to (44), we have
µ∗j∂aix
∗
j + (x
∗
j − aj)∂aiµ∗j = 0, ∀i 6= j,
so that µ∗j > 0 would imply ∂aix∗j = 0, which causes a
contradiction. To summarize, there exists at most one i ∈ [T ]
such that ‖∂aix∗‖1 = 2 (i.e., case 2 holds), whereas for other
j 6= i we have
∥∥∂ajx∗∥∥1 = 0 (i.e., either case 1 or 3 holds).
This implies that
∑T
j=1
∥∥∂ajx∗∥∥1 ≤ 2, which completes the
proof.
D. Proof of Lemma 22
Define Iµ = {i : µ∗i = 0, x∗i = ai}. If Iµ is empty, then
strict complementary slackness for the constraint x  a holds.
For any i ∈ Iµ, we have ν∗ = ai−x0,i and λ∗i = 0 according
to (35) and (37). For any other j /∈ Iµ, one of the following
three cases must hold: (1) x∗j = 0; (2) x∗j = aj; (3) 0 < x∗j <
aj . The last case implies that λ∗j = µ∗j = 0, so that we have
x∗j = ai − x0,i + x0,j , where i ∈ Iλ. Since both b and x0 are
fixed, and only one ai among all i ∈ [T ] is allowed to change
due to the constraint imposed by the integration path L, we can
use a similar argument as the one in the proof of Lemma 19
to conclude that there are finitely many values of a along L
such that the constraint b = 1Tx∗ is satisfied.
